K.R. Passey | Book Review
The Post-American World
By Fareed Zakaria
292 pp. W.W. Norton & Company
Writing a book about the sweep of world events and the disposition of cultures is always a risky proposition. First, it is impossible for the writer to give the topic full justice within the covers of a book that can be lifted. Second, the complexity of detail would require footnotes triple the size of the text. The reader of such a work must take up the project with the non-fiction equivalent of a willing suspension of disbelief: the willing suspension of thick description.[1] Third, the world and its nations move on, and changing events have a way of discrediting even the most perspicacious of analyzes.
Fareed Zakaria, editor of Newsweek International and host of Fareed Zakaria GPS for CNN, manages, however, to illuminate current world history fairly well in this book. His style flows quickly but not too quickly from summaries to evidence and back again. Unlike Thomas Friedman,[2] Zakaria does not strain at a contrived metaphor. He appends his title with an inside-the-book textual theme that explores “the rise of the rest.” American decline then, and the post-American era, is defined by the American role in the rise of other countries, notably Brazil, Russia, India and China, Jim O’Neill’s BRICs[3] of the new world economy, with particular focus on the latter two. Zakaria’s most recent edition also contains a new 20-page preface that updates readers on the worldwide economic distress of the current day. The preface deals with the changes wrought by time and segues to the major themes he introduces in the rest of the book.
Those themes are several. He attributes America’s current place in the world order as sole superpower to three forces: politics, economics, and technology, and examines how the three powers play out in the post-American era. This power tripartite may seem obvious unless you just finished reading Jared Diamond’s Guns, Germs and Steel. Diamond lists one-celled micro-organisms and natural resources in his power trinity.[4] Both authors include technology.
Another of Zakaria’s post-American themes is that the rising of the “others” need not dictate a decline of American power and influence, and certainly not the disintegration of American society. America may instead seize a powerful new role of leadership as a non-hegemonic builder of conversation and consensus in a multi-polar world order. Zakaria moves away from a Clintonian model and puts forward the example of George the First. G.H.W. Bush, he says, set a precedent in the way he gleaned global cooperation and built international will and military force to stop the aggression of Saddam Hussein. Bush I set up (through Colin Powell) exemplary management of combined military forces, and stayed within the operational parameters of the agreement, and successfully executed the exit strategy.
Zakaria has no praise for George the Second, however, and places a delineated load of blame on the son and his administration lackeys for not just undoing the good work of the father but adding immeasurably to future American foreign policy challenges by his arrogant display of unilateral aggressive force in Iraq and unilateral attitude in decision-making .
One is tempted to bring in Samuel P. Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations for a round of compare-and-contrast but Zakaria has only two bantamweight references to the conservative icon of culture wars and in both he agrees with Huntington’s points. The first is the accuracy of the ungainly “uni-multipolarity” term Huntington used to describe one super-power (the U.S.) among many powers (BRIC, Europe, Japan and a growing list of others)[5]. The second is the apparent agreement with Huntington’s argument that modernization and Westernization are wholly distinct with the latter solidifying circa A.D. 700-800 and the former not accomplished until the 1700s.[6] These two points might be straw dogs, however, because it is not clear who would argue either.
However, it is very clear that Zakaria disagrees with Huntington on almost everything else, even if the conservative’s name s not invoked. Huntington’s idea that religious ideology is a major dividing line for humanity and the highly probably source for future discord and war is one example. Zakaria acknowledges the existence of religious tensions and that they will play a role in world strife. He also, like Zbigniew Brzezinski, believes in a “global political awakening” that results in renewed pride of nationhood in the rising others. Economic success, higher education levels, growing transparency of government and a recently acquired, more accurate version of history feed that pride.[7] Zakaria observes that the resultant awakening produces positive elements of nationalism but that an uglier side fraught with pent-up frustrations may also emerge. A less dogmatic, more consultive U.S. approach that also recognizes the parts of its own foreign policy rife with hypocrisy, he asserts, can assuage the uglier parts of nationalism. The preachy approach of subtle or obvious proselytizing to ideology must go.
Ideology can be a tool for looking at history that helps splice together story lines and untie cultural knots, like the sailor’s marlinespike, used shipboard to splice lines and untie knots. But Zakaria’s take on China’s ideology is new for me. Today’s China, he argues, has no ideology, which grows from the fact that the country is largely a subscriber to Confucianism – also non-ideological and certainly, as practiced in China, non-religious. Those who have successfully stirred up a healthy Sino-scare in my soul neglected to elaborate on this piece of information. As a result, I was relieved to get this perspective.
Zakaria sees a pragmatic China, with its own peculiar brand of Communist/socialistic politics, wedded to centrally planned capitalism. Beijing has the advantage of extremely long-term planning that aims at relentlessly solving its problems – but gradually, all the while maintaining economic growth and internal stability. The Chinese autocracy is primarily interested in those two outcomes. China is not now and has rarely been in its past a zealous missionary for any ideology, and it views with distain those who are. China has no designs on running the rest of the world. Its massive military expenditures (though dwarfed into second place by U.S. military spending) have no aggressive purpose outside its own traditional boundaries, excepting a nod to policing its own trade routes, coastline and waterways.
Zakaria’s China point is in sharp contrast to more conservative thinkers like Robert Kagan.[8] Kagan argues that autocracy itself is an ideology and one that China will inevitably be pushing forward as part of the natural progression of power. While I find this argument somewhat compelling, I choke on Kagan’s idea, pushed regularly by former presidential candidate Sen. John McCain, that the U.S. should gather a “league of democracies” to combat what will be China’s more inevitable push of its autocracy-cum-ideology. India is part of the reason for my swallowing difficulty here, and my final point, one done well by native son Zakaria.
India, he believes, has two distinct advantages over China that could modify China’s impact on world economy and power. The first is the fact that the messy and long-term erratic growth of democratic India and its current 1 billion citizens is settling day-by-day into more predictable parameters. Secondly, India has a leg up on China with regard to maintaining a growing population of workers. Whereas China’s one-child policy has given it an oversupply of male children and problematic internal growth rates, India continues to produce a more average male-female ratio, the sort that eventually becomes critical in sustaining market growth. Aging populations draw heavily on economic reserves and spell future trouble. The European Union also suffers from declining populations of working citizens. High internal birthrates spare India from the problem.
Unfortunately, the other side of this benefit is overpopulation and overcrowding. Zakaria, beyond a too-brief exploration of agrarian reform, does not resolve this contradiction. He does only slightly better with his assertion that the U.S. will, or could, be saved from stagnation by immigration but there is a problem.
This brings us full circle to Zakaria’s worries about immigration and about why America might not stay ahead of “the rest” for much longer. He maintains that our political system’s polarizing tendencies are among our biggest weaknesses. For the past two or three decades we have not shown a sustained ability to solve our problems and move ahead using the mandatory democratic tools of compromise and non-partisan consensus. That tendency toward polarity and partisanship bodes ill for the sort of consultive, cooperative, compromise consensus approach it will take to lead the world in Zakaria’s post-American world.
Except for this and a few other streaks, Fareed Zarakia is viewing the world through mostly clean glass. Time will show us whether it is tinted.
[1] Clifford Geertz’s term for social sciences’ nuanced and heavily detailed analysis of cultures, that expands on anomalies and exceptions. Geertz, Clifford. (1973). Thick description: Toward an interpretative theory of culture.
In C. Geertz,
The interpretation of cultures (pp. 3–30). NY: Basic Books.
[2] Friedman picked the backward-looking flat earth metaphor. The effort of forcing his data and examples into a convoluted conformity troubled the reader throughout the book and its sequels. See Friedman, Thomas L. (2005). The world is flat: A brief history of the twenty-first century. NY: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux.
[3] O’Neill, head of global economic research at Goldman Sachs, used the acronym in two influential papers, Dreaming with BRICs? (No. 99), and How Solid are the BRICs, (No. 134).
[4] Diamond, a California professor of physiology, does not endeavor to capture the current state of world affairs but argues convincingly by way of anthropology, behavioral ecology, linguistics, and epidemiology that how cultures and nations developed toward their status is an extrapolation of economics and politics on “guns, germs, and steel.”
[5] These interlocking topics are an important part of Huntington’s discussion and occupy two sub-sections (“The West and Modernization,” and “Responses to the West and Modernization,” in his book). See Huntington, Samuel P. (1996). The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order. (pps. 68-78). NY: Simon and Schuster.
[6] Op. cit.
[7] Brzezinski, Zbigniew (2005). “The dilemma of the last sovereign.” American Interest1. No. 1, in The Post-American World, (pps. 33-34).
[8] Kagan is nothing if not credentialed. He is a Senior Associate with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and member of the Council on Foreign Relations, a columnist for the Washington Post and is syndicated by the New York Times Syndicate. He is a contributing editor at both The New Republic and the Weekly Standard, and has written for the New York Times, Foreign Affairs, the Wall Street Journal, Commentary, World Affairs, and Policy Review. His book, Of Paradise and Power, was a national and international bestseller and has been translated into 25 languages. His book, Dangerous Nation, won the 2007 Lepgold Prize from Georgetown University. He is listed by Foreign Policy and Prospect as one of the world’s “Top 100 Public Intellectuals.” He was a foreign policy advisor to John McCain, the Republican Party’s nominee for President of the United States in the 2008 election. See also Kagan, Robert (2008). The return of history and the end of dreams. NY: Alfred A. Knopf.